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ABSTRACT 
 
The Open Door, Dollar Diplomacy, and the Self-Strengthening Movement: The Birth of 
 
American Idealist Imperialism in China, 1890 - 1912 
 
 
by  
 
Frederic Poag 
 
 
American Foreign Policy at the outset of the Twentieth century evolved from a realist to 
an idealist position as the United States transitioned to an imperial power. This ideal 
framework was formed in the crucible of China during the Spheres of Influence and the 
Open Door. The US had to play delicate game of helping China to maintain their territo-
rial, and administrative integrity while at the same time protecting their newly acquired 
overseas interests against more established imperial actors. While there were many 
missteps, and failures during this transition perhaps the most the important result was 
the change toward the approach of US foreign policy.  Not only did the United States 
have to balance realist geo-political goals, but it had to define what an imperial United 
States looked like. In a sense the United States was starting from scratch, processing to 
a completely different game and in order to be successful it had evolve. 
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CHAPTER 1 
  INTRODUCTION  
 American Foreign Policy at the outset of the twentieth century evolved from a re-
alist to an idealist position during the United States transition to an imperial power. This 
transition was formed in the crucible of China where the United States had to compete 
with imperial powers who were more experienced. Unlike the geo-political moves made 
in the Caribbean and South America the United States was not in a position of strength. 
Wishing to protect the gains from the newly acquired Philippines the US played a deli-
cate game of trying to navigate amongst Spheres of Influence without over playing its 
hand.  The course of action taken, the Open Door and Dollar Diplomacy, was the ideal-
ist approach the United States attempted in China.  Both of these contained multiple 
goals that at times were at odds with each other.  At the heart of both policies, and 
American imperial policy in China, was the commitment to actively open new commer-
cial opportunities for American investors.  The second provision was a commitment to 
maintain the territorial and administrative integrity of China. While there were many mis-
steps and failures during this transition perhaps the most important result was the 
change toward the approach of US foreign policy.  Rather than an extension of favors to 
political supporters of the President, the United States shifted to an institutional ap-
proach; one based more on merit than nepotism.  Instead, a reactionary American for-
eign policy was forced to define itself, and out of that came a professionally trained, bu-
reaucratic apparatus that carried it out.  The spread of democratic principles and com-
merce became the motivation.  America began to think of itself as a Great Power; one 
that was interested in shaping world affairs. In contrast China underwent its own change 
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as the Qing government weakened and then collapsed due to a combination of internal 
and external pressures.  Thus far, a lot of research has focused on the personalities, 
Roosevelt and later Wilson in particular, behind the US shifting into a world power.  And 
while they played a pivotal role they were as much swept up by events more often than 
they shaped them. Thus the impetus for this shift in attitude can be traced more to a 
combination of world events, technological innovation, and economic transformation 
both at home and abroad. 
 This paper focuses on Asia, particularly China, and the nature of Dollar Diplo-
macy and the Open Door there.  While the failure to compete effectively against other 
foreign powers in China exposed the central weakness of the Open Door Policy as it re-
lated to the political realities it also formed the framework of American foreign policy as 
an imperial power.  It was the competition in Asia, the reality of coming into the Great 
Game late that did more to form American foreign policy; specifically in regards to defin-
ing itself as a Global Power than the US’s free hand in South America.  In the absence 
of the Monroe Doctrine and later the Roosevelt Corollary, the US was forced to use di-
plomacy from a militarily weakened position. While the US was schizophrenic at times 
about building up its military might. In China the United States was in the position of a 
weaker imperial power. At home the American public did not whole heartedly embrace 
imperialism if at all. This tension was the catalyst for the embrace of an idealist position.  
The Open Door was the first example of this idealist position of imperial America. 
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The Door Swings: The Open Door and the Evolution of American Foreign Policy   
 Even though the Open Door (the United States central foreign policy principle in 
China) failed to compete effectively against other Great Powers it laid the foundation for 
America’s framework as an imperial power. While the Open Door vacillated at times be-
tween a realist position to an idealist one, and back again, in order to meet foreign pol-
icy goals it remained a palatable notion that US leaders could embrace to expand US 
influence overseas. The lure of the Open Door was simple; equal privileges for all coun-
tries, at least the Great Powers, that operated in China and support for the administra-
tive and territorial integrity of China. Its goal was to minimize conflict or potential spots 
of aggression. This was particularly important for a newly arrived imperial power like the 
United States. The weaknesses of the Open Door were often glaring and in many ways 
unavoidable. Russia, Germany, and Japan, all new powers on the Imperial scene, 
carved out space against the older, more established powers of Great Britain and 
France left in the space by Spain which has declined to a non-factor. China’s unstable 
Qing government itself was nearing the end of a long decline and its power to maintain 
its own sovereignty. Thus, it had much less capacity to act as a stabilizing influence in 
the region, particularly given the fact it dealt with multiple devastating insurrection and 
rebellions. As these powers sought to “carve up the melon” conflict inevitably arose.  
 The Open Door as a policy was first conceived by President William McKinley’s 
Secretary of State, John Hay. For most of its history the United States’ point of focus, in 
terms of expansion, was on the continent of North America. After the acquisition of the 
Philippines, at the close of the 20th century, the United States now had to contend with 
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an overseas possession far from their traditional lines of communication amongst a ca-
dre of potential hostile foreign powers. The Open Door thus served a dual purpose dur-
ing this transition. First, to make imperialism palatable to Americans by couching it in an 
idealist framework, one that promoted not so much the spread of democracy, that came 
later, and the opening of new markets. Even though real world events spurred the 
United States toward becoming an imperial power, realist motives would not suffice. For 
Imperialism to be implemented as policy in the United States it had to be backed with 
idealism. While it seems naive today that something like the Open Door, without the 
threat of real military power, could be enforced on other imperial powers it was the best 
option the United States had at the time considering the shape of its armed forces. The 
United States simply was not ready to become an imperial power, though it would learn 
quickly. 
 The Open Door represented a was necessity for early American foreign policy. 
The principle of free trade, and democratically elected governance was part of a deeply 
embedded cultural identity for the United States though their application was far from re-
ality. But it was this identity that made the application of an idealist policy a much more 
attractive option for an imperial United States.  The idealist notion of free trade con-
trasted with the realist notion of support for the territorial integrity of China. In order for 
imperialism to be palatable to the American public it needed to be in line with the Ameri-
can nationalistic identity. Thus, the Open Door evolved and changed in its meaning as 
each successive administration sought to use it in the best interests of the United States 
because in its roots it contained an idealist sentiment.   
 
  
8 
Manifest Destiny Goes Global: Moving from a Continental to Imperial Power 
   By the opening of the 20th century the United States was a strong, but continen-
tal power.  The American Frontier officially closed in 1890.  Manifest Destiny, for the 
most part, had run its course. Historian Frederick Jackson Turner in his famous 1893 
essay The Significance of the Frontier in American History wondered what this might 
mean for the future of the nation. Internal challenges to American hegemony, the Native 
American tribes, were quashed with death toll on a genocidal level. The US’s northern 
neighbor, Canada, if not an ally, was by and large a peaceful neighbor. And even 
though tensions existed with the United States’ southern neighbor, Mexico, the last act 
of aggression on America would be a minor raid carried out by Pancho Villa on Colum-
bus, New Mexico in 1916. Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Alaska, and Hawaii were 
still territories on their way to becoming states. In short, there were no more worlds to 
conquer on the continent of North America. It was this lack of a frontier, an empty space 
to fill that Turner latched onto in his essay.  He warned that without a frontier this drive 
to settle and expand would be replaced by a European like imperialism.  
“Yes, it is an American ideal and an American example for which we fight; but in    
  that ideal and example lies medicine for the healing of nations. It is the best  
  we have to give to Europe, and it is a matter of vital import that we shall   
  safeguard and preserve our power to serve the world, and not be overwhelmed  
  in the flood of imperialistic force that wills the death of democracy and would  
  send the freeman under the yoke.”i   
 
Instead of nurturing the impulse of aggression perhaps the United States could 
cultivate that passion into other fields namely enterprise and technological advance-
ment? “Essential as are our contributions of wealth, the work of our scientists, the toil of 
our farmers and our workmen in factory and shipyard, priceless as is the stream of 
young American manhood which we pour forth to stop the flood which flows like molten 
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lava across the green fields and peaceful hamlets of Europe toward the sea and turns to 
ashes and death all that it covers, these contributions have their deeper meaning in the 
American spirit. They are born of the love of Democracy.”ii  Whatever new form the US’s 
imperial path would take as it emerged as one of the Great Powers, it was imperative 
that it needed to retain the moral high ground. Thus, the US’s imperial foreign policy’s 
roots were, to some degree, idealist.  
American imperialism was to be different, at least in initial conception from 
Rudyard Kipling’s famous “White Man’s Burden”. It had to be a horse of another color, 
but still a horse in make up. Just over a century after its bloody birth and less than fifty 
years after the Civil War that almost tore the nation apart the United States jumped into 
“Great Game”.  However, this impulse was not just the desire to spread democracy or 
even expand territorial borders. Rapid changes in the American economy, specifically 
the shift from the production of raw materials to finished goods, drove the impetus for 
America to become an imperial power. And while the United States always contained 
rich men, even before the founding of the United States, the 19th century produced 
wealth that was unheralded.  
In the later half of the 19th century the American economy produced some of the 
wealthiest men in the world.  With names like Rockefeller, Carnegie, Vanderbilt, and 
J.P. Morgan these men laid the foundation of what was to be the manufacturing super 
engine of the 1940’s. This era, the turn of the century of America, was called the Gilded 
Age, a termed coined by authors Charles Dudley Warner and Mark Twain. Referencing 
the thin veneer of gold plating popular in decorating at the time the Gilded Age was an 
age of progress, technological advancement but also one of corrupt politicians, graft 
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and greed from monopolies and shady dealings.  Men of enormous financial power 
were called captains of industry by their admirers and robber barons by their detractors. 
These men of influence and power, who more often than not, gained their position 
through unethical business practices rationalized their methods in order to give them a 
veneer of nobility. A rationalization to be sure, but one that was grounded in idealistic 
thinking.  Nothing exemplified this more than steel magnate Andrew Carnegie’s Gospel 
of Wealth. 
“This, then, is held to be the duty of the man of Wealth: First, to set an example of modest,  
 unostentatious living, shunning display or extravagance; to provide moderately for the legitimate  
 wants of those dependent upon him; and after doing so to consider all surplus revenues which  
 come to him simply as trust funds, which he is called upon to administer, and strictly bound as a  
 matter of duty to administer in the manner which, in his judgment, is best calculated to produce  
 the most beneficial result for the community the man of wealth thus becoming the sole agent and  
 trustee for his poorer brethren, bringing to their service his superior wisdom, experience, and  
 ability to administer doing for them better than they would or could do for themselves.”iii 
  
 This reinterpretation of noblesse oblige serviced a dual purpose. It was a call to 
action, even if patronizingly so, for the elite to act for the benefit of society, but it also 
justified their position by appealing to a higher power. In four decades the United States, 
just over a century old had endured the bloodiest conflict in its history, more than all of 
their previous conflicts combined. It had suffered three assassinations, racial tensions 
from unpacking black slavery, immigration tensions, and a near genocide of native peo-
ples on top of glaring wealth inequality. Baked into American democracy were idealistic 
notions of equality but it could only be seen through rose-colored glasses. And this 
young democracy was about to leap into the “Great Game”, to jump onto the imperial 
stage. The spread of democracy would take on pseudo-religious rhetorical framework 
even if the economic necessity was more of a catalyst for this imperialistic drive. 
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Panics and Progress: The Pain of Economic Growth 
   The four decades after the Civil War the US economy accelerated in growth and 
development which put it on par with the great powers of Europe. Despite economic 
downturns, known as “panics”, which were part and parcel of the boom and bust cycles 
of the National Banking Era (1863-1913), the American economy transitioned from one 
that was a primary exporter for raw materials into one that manufactured finished goods. 
The 1870’s and 80’s was a breakaway period in terms of real wages increased along 
with American GDP (Gross Domestic Product).iv  By the end of the Spanish American 
war in 1898 corn crop yields rose by 222% while wheat increased even further by 256% 
from their respective figures in 1865.  While impressive other industries did even better. 
Railroads continued to be built at a frantic pace. Rail construction had increased by 
567% and coal production went even further with an increase of over 800%.v  
 This pace in production was also matched by the impetus of westward expansion 
which lead to territorial settlement and acquisition. The West was to be tamed. The fron-
tier was settled, and several industries saw revolutions not only in manufacturing, which 
resulted in changes to daily life.  Finished household goods made men like King C. 
Gillette, who marketed the first Gillette safety razor in 1903, wealthy men, and changed 
the grooming habits of men. This was made possible not simply because of changes in 
the process of manufacturing, but also in marketing and delivery of those goods to con-
sumers. Richard M. Sears, founder of the same company which bears his name, pub-
lished a catalog of consumer products. Its target audience was farmers who switched to 
Sears because of a feeling of being gouged by local store owners, and the greater se-
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lection of finished goods Sears offered.  First published in 1888 the Sears Catalog “fea-
tured only watches and jewelry… (but) by 1895 was producing a 532-page catalog with 
many other items. This book offered shoes, women's garments and millinery, wagons, 
fishing tackle, stoves, furniture, china, musical instruments, saddles, firearms, buggies, 
bicycles, baby carriages and glassware, in addition to watches and jewelry.”vi  No longer 
simply an exporter of raw material for Great Britain and Europe the American economy 
transformed into a competitor with finished goods of its own. Thus, American entrepre-
neurs now sought their own space in international markets in order to sell their wares. 
Even with the overall growth of the American economy not everyone reaped in the re-
wards. 
 Economist Milton Friedman noted that "The highest decadal rate for periods of 
about ten years was apparently reached in the (eighteen) eighties with approximately 
3.8 percent.”vii While spurts of phenomenal growth were had during this time it was 
marked by periods of bust cycles that threatened to disrupt this progress.  This 
boom/bust continued until more stringent banking regulations were put into place during 
the Great Depression in the 1930’s.  American workers also began to organize and de-
mand not only better wages but better working conditions as well. The first labor unions, 
like the Knights of Labor, formed and advocated the need for collective action.  Owners 
of capital pushed back, and soon labor strikes turned into riots resulting in property de-
struction, injuries, and even death. While not every day occurrences these upheavals, 
nonetheless, were part and parcel of the transition of the American economy. While 
there was money to be made by savvy entrepreneurs it could also be lost through a 
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mistimed investment or a downturn in the economy. It was the need to find other mar-
kets and to weather these panics which lead American entrepreneurs to search for 
other markets aboard. China became a particularly attractive choice.  
 
The Cathay Siren Song: America Keeps Looking West All the Way to the East 
   Since the days of Marco Polo the lure of China has called to Western entrepre-
neurs as means of acquiring vast wealth. From merchants taking the trek along the Silk 
Road to Christopher Columbus searching for a way by sea by sailing west, the Far East, 
particularly India and China, was there to be reached then exploited for profit. However 
these treks from the West were usually in the form of exceptions, rather than the rule. It 
was not until the British decided to create a more lasting impact by using its navy to 
force open trade that the market in China was opened up in a big way. This was an ex-
ample of a merchant with a product in need of a market. This time it was opium. Known 
as the Anglo-Chinese Wars, or the Opium Wars, the British fought several, small scale 
conflicts in 1839 to 1842, and again in 1856 to 1860 that opened up parts of China to 
trade. Needing a market for opium the British fought several successive small scale 
conflicts to open up parts of China to western trade.  In each of these conflicts the Brit-
ish were successful and forced China to sign unequal treaties with the Treaty of Nanjing 
having the most impact. The Qing government granted the British a multitude of ces-
sions. The first opened five major ports along the coast of China. Also, foreign mission-
aries were legally permitted to reside in China. Further, if any British citizen were to be 
tried for a crime it had to take place in a British court and not under a Qing magistrate. 
This last concession, known as extraterritoriality, proved especially humiliating for the 
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Qing because it essentially nullified their authority within the boundaries of their own ter-
ritory. Thus, foreigners who broke the law and harmed their citizens could not be tried in 
their courts. They were tried in a foreigner’s court of law which was more likely to show 
them leniency. In addition to these concessions the Chinese had to pay an indemnity 
and the British were under no obligations themselves under these treaties.  
Because of the heavily one sided nature of the treaties the Chinese considered 
them unequal.  Further, each subsequent defeat at the hands of western powers 
brought with it more concessions, and other western powers followed suit in demanding 
the same. This was known as the “Most Favored Nation” trading clause.  Soon China 
was carved up to spheres of influence, referred to as “slicing the melon” by the Chinese. 
And with the establishment of these spheres the western powers simply transported 
their homeland rivalries and grudges to China. By 1898 when the United States gained 
possession of the Philippines from the Spanish they were already a late arrival to the 
China spheres of influence game. Something needed to be implemented if the United 
States had any hope of establishing itself as a major power without inciting another for-
eign power of imperial conquest. One way was to advocate that the other powers agree 
to the territorial integrity of China, but this became more and more difficult as the great 
powers sought to solidify their games. To make matters worse the Qing were on the 
verge of collapse by the time the United States came into the picture in China. However 
the Qing did not sit idle and wait for the inevitable. In fact they tried, unsuccessfully, to 
implement a program of growth much like the Meiji government of Japan would accom-
plish. While ultimately not a success its purpose was to try and free China from the 
grasp of foreign control and help China to become a great power. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FRACTURED FROM WITHIN: THE FAILURE OF THE SELF STRENGTHENING 
MOVEMENT 
The Self-Strengthening Movement, an attempt to modernize China through the 
acquisition of western technology and science, was a failure due to numerous factors 
but mainly due to the rivaled, fractured political factions of the Qing Dynasty.  It was be-
cause of this fractured nature the Qing never achieved a cohesive strategy that brought 
these divisive elements together behind a single purpose.  It did not help that without 
exception all Qing officials, from the Empress Dowager Cixi to the lowest regional bu-
reaucrat were suspicious of all things foreign, which was not surprising, but the degree 
to which they let it influence their actions varied from person to person.  While an anti-
foreign position was prevalent among the populace it ultimately was the failure of the 
Qing Imperial Court that hampered efforts for modernization. Instead, modernization in 
China occurred piecemeal and varied from mandarin to mandarin. It was not carried out 
as a coherent and comprehensive national policy which was quite the opposite during 
the Meiji Restoration in Japan. In fact, a leading figure in subtly pushing for it to fail was 
the Empress Dowager Cixi. 
The Empress Dowager Cixi’s position in the Imperial Court was always a tennis 
one. One way she maintained her power base was by playing the political factions 
against each other. Thus, she vacillated between support for the “belligerent” faction 
which was anti-foreign, and anti-reform. The “belligerent” faction was much easier to 
support so ultimately that was where the Empress Dowager would land.  The reform 
faction was headed by Prince Gong of Aisin Gioro clan who served as imperial regent of 
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the Qing from 1861 to 1865 then later by Li Hongzhang who served as diplomat, gen-
eral and Viceroy.  While in the minority the Reform faction wanted to modernize China 
in a similar manner Japan was accomplished under Meiji.   To clarify, the reform faction 
was not pro-foreign in terms of keeping the status quo by giving up spheres of influence 
to imperial powers.  The Reform faction felt that using Western methods in science and 
technology while at the same time reorganizing the government to make it function 
more efficiently were the keys to China regaining its sovereignty. This lack of central au-
thority was part design, but also part from not fully recovering from calamity that had 
plagued the Qing Dynasty: internal rebellion on a massive scale.  Lingering effects that 
stemmed from the devastation wrought from the Taiping Rebellion, and the Second 
Opium War, or Arrow War, were both blows to the governing authority of the Qing gov-
ernment. Then, the Treaty of Tientsin, followed by the Nian rebellion and the Muslim up-
risings hampered the recovery.  However, the corruption of the civil service bureaucracy 
was a significant factor as well.   
While corruption in any institution is inevitable, it took on a different characteristic 
under the Qing government, one which was based on culture and was not. Because of 
this corruption it hampered the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895) and the 
Tongzhi Restoration (1860–1874).  The corruption in the civil service bureaucracy led to 
the failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement and the Tongzhi Restoration as a whole.  
The endemic corruption was another issue that led to the failure of the Self-Strengthen-
ing Movement. The leaders of the movement never united behind a single purpose, and 
while the Confucian ideal was already established in many ways it had become dog-
matic, a rote bit of memorization that no longer pushed a vibrant institutional culture.  
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Leaders Lead: Prince Gong Negotiates the Unequal Treaties 
 In 1860, the Qing dynasty was on the verge of collapse. For ten long years the 
Taiping Rebellion dragged on weakening the Imperial Court. The rebel force held onto 
some of the most prosperous and populous regions in the south of China. By 1860, the 
Taiping Rebellion had become a total war for the future of China. Entire cities were 
wiped from the map. Famine was rampant in some areas as crops were pillaged or 
simply burned. Bodies piled up as the war became more about revenge and retribution 
rather than strategic objectives.  The Taiping Rebellion took place in the southern region 
of China and lasted from 1850 to 1864. It was a bloody civil which caused wide spread 
destruction and destabilized the country. To make matters worse, the Europeans de-
cided enough was enough and a combined expedition bore down on the Qing capital at 
Peking, modern day Beijing. 
 On September 22, 1860, the Xianfeng Emperor of the Qing Dynasty left Peking 
leaving Prince Gong (his half brother) to conduct the inevitable negotiations with the 
representatives from the English and French whose combined forces were bearing 
down on the city.  The Xianfeng Emperor along with his closest advisors of the Belliger-
ent faction left for the frontier city of Jehol; even though the Qing forces outnumbered 
the allied Anglo-French expeditionary force by a sizable margin and were lead by famed 
general Seng-ko-lin-ch’in they’d been defeated. Now the Imperial Court abandoned the 
capital.  This situation for the Qing was dire. The flight of the court was illustrated by 
Manchu statesman Wen-hsiang: 
 
  After I had bade farewell to the Emperor, Prince Kungviii and I made the necessary arrangement.     
 Between five and seven o’clock in the evening, I entered the city and climbed to the top of the   
 Ch’ao-yang gate.  Then I discovered that for several days the garrison troops had not received  
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 their rice rations and that their weapons were entirely inadequate.  Our general position was  
 about to collapse.  Matters were so urgent that there was no time to memorialize.  The only thing I  
 could do was to open up the storehouses and distribute money and rice, leaving the memorial  
 until later.ix 
 
Prince Gong was given no troops to resist the entry of the Anglo-French expedi-
tionary force into the city. The Xianfeng Emperor and his Court having fled and rioting in 
the streets as the populace of Peking assumed the worst in a city about to be sacked.  
Before this, Prince Gong had been a man of little merit in the public arena. He had not 
received great praise, had no major accomplishments to his name, nor did anyone in 
the Imperial Court think he was capable of performing great accomplishments. He was 
simply the guy who needed to stay behind and either clean up the mess or take the 
blame. No one considered him worthy of great praise or even capable of accomplish-
ment.  However, with the imperial court’s flight from Peking, Prince Gong found himself 
the de-facto Qing Head of State but more importantly he was the right man for a difficult 
job. Prince Gong managed to keep the wolves at bay and proved he was a capable, 
and effective statesman. However, his work was not finished. The Qing needed a re-
prieve from the Europeans. Thus, the Tongzhi Restoration was off to an inauspicious 
start. 
 Before he return to the Imperial Court, Prince Gong was officially appointed to 
the head of the Qing Office of Foreign Affairs, the Zongli Yamen, and Grand Councilor. 
He was given power to negotiate with the Europeans.  After nearly a month of negotia-
tion as a representative of the Xianfeng Emperor of the Qing Dynasty Prince Gong 
signed separate treaties with partners of the Expeditionary Force. Thus, the treaty of 
Tientsin was ratified and the Second Opium War came to an end on October 18, 1860.  
The British were granted land leases on the Kowloon Peninsula in Hong Kong, without 
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conditions, in perpetuity. Russia received land to certain regions in Outer Manchuria 
and rights to territory in Ussuri Krai bringing that region into their sphere of influence. 
Besides land, one thing these treaties did was legalize the opium trade in China and 
opened more ports for trade specifically the plum of Nanking.  In terms of diplomacy it 
gave the right of foreign powers to establish legations, if not embassies, in Peking. It 
also gave Christian missionaries the right to spread their faith. Basically, it not only rec-
ognized foreign governments, putting them on equal footing with the Qing government, 
but also legitimatized foreign presence in China.  
 Under the threat of annihilation Prince Gong signed treaties which made heavy 
concessions, but it bought the Qing precious time. The Taiping Rebellion dragged on for 
another four years, and the Qing government hung by a thread. To illustrate just how 
touch and go it was for the Qing’s position the British Commander James Bruce, the 8th 
Earl of Elgin, wanted to destroy the Forbidden City in reprisal for the torture and confine-
ment of two British envoys along with their small escort of English and Indian troops. In-
stead, the British settled for demolishing the Old Summer Palace, Yuan Ming Yuan, 
since it was felt the destruction of the Forbidden City might derail treaty negotiations.  In 
her book The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restorationx, 1862-
1874 Mary C. Wright illustrated the position Prince Gong and the Qing Government 
found themselves in at the Peking Convention. 
There was a widespread feeling that the dynasty was toppling and that an age of anarchy was at 
hand.  From a Chinese point of view this fate was not only inevitable but just, unless the Manchu 
ruling house and the Chinese governing class could between them perform a miracle: suppress 
revolution, check foreign aggression, and re-establish domestic order. What was required was not 
merely the restoration at the eleventh hour of effective government along traditional lines but the 
creation of new policies that could ward off modern domestic and foreign threats and yet preserve 
the Confucian society and its ideology.xi 
  
20 
Old Ways Meets New Methods: The Tongzhi Restoration 
 Named after the tenth Emperor of the Qing Dynasty, 1861-1875 the Tongzhi 
Restoration, was ambitious in its scope, one of the most impressive, all encompassing 
overhauls of government during the 19th century. Due to the severity of the crisis every-
thing was on the table in an effort to preserve the state.  The civil bureaucracy was reor-
ganized. Plans for the modernization of the military were implemented, new ways of 
thinking and planning the economy, all while trying to reestablish local control of areas 
the Qing dynasty held and trying to put down a very bloody rebellion that would not end 
until 1864. Plus, there were the ever encroaching European powers that always sought 
more influence, but were also necessary for ideas and implementation of these reforms. 
All of this was to be carried out with an active anti-foreign political faction that wanted 
nothing to do with reform, but to simply oust the Europeans who had already proven the 
Qing’s superior from a technological standpoint.  Ironically, the goal of the reformers 
was not radical social change that would wash away the old order. In fact, the Reform-
ers sought to restore the central government of the Qing to prominence.  In the minds of 
these Confucian-scholar bureaucrats like Prince Gong, Zeng Guofan, and Li 
Hongzhang their ultimate aim was to simply reestablish Confucian principles. They un-
derstood if the Qing Dynasty had any hope of survival, it would need to modernize.  It 
was a moral movement steeped in Confucian idealism. Government officials who acted 
to uphold the Qing structure but implemented modernized practices would return China 
to a harmonious state.  The task before the reformers was Herculean in its proportions, 
but even so they almost succeeded. 
 To understand the aims and motivations of each faction it would be a mistake to 
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characterize them in the modern political parlance of progressive and conservative.  
Prince Gong’s faction was progressive only in the acquisition of Western technology 
and scientific understanding.  It was not a cultural revolution or even an insurrection. 
There was no attempt to bring about a Western style democracy. Nor, would it be cor-
rect to frame the “belligerent” faction, which was headed by the Xianfeng Emperor and 
later the Dowager Empress Cixi, as opposed to the goals of the reformers. In fact, they 
shared many of the same goals: strengthen the old Qing ruling order through Confucian 
ideals and to extricate China from repressive treaties imposed on it by the Europeans.  
And both aims were to strengthen the territorial integrity of China and uphold the sover-
eignty of the Qing.  Where the tension arose was how to accomplish these aims and the 
dividing line was how to deal with the Fire Superiority of the Europeans. 
For the reform faction an immediate military solution was simply out of the ques-
tion. The fire superiority of the Anglo Expeditionary Force was without question, particu-
larly the English and the French.  Thus, the solution for the Reformers was two fold: ac-
quire superior technology and reform the organization of the military. To bring about this 
reorganization effort Prince Gong proposed the Self-Strengthening Movement.  
On the flip side the belligerent or conservative faction was dogged, almost single 
minded in its pursuit of expelling foreigners from China immediately. This faction also 
had sizable support from the populace.  After the expulsion of the Europeans, the Qing 
government could turn its attention to addressing domestic reforms.  The conservative 
faction embraced foreign firearms, artillery, ships, even military training, but retaking the 
port cities and reestablishing the feudalistic tribute system was the priority. 
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While the fear of foreign influence was significant in the almost schizophrenic ap-
proach to the Tongzhi Restoration ultimately the wounds it suffered were self inflicted. 
And while the Western powers always had their own best interests in mind and certainly 
were not altruistic in their motives to help China modernize internal politics contributed 
to the decline.  It would be unfair to characterize Imperial China under the Qing as the 
exception to suffer with corruption and mismanagement considering those faults are en-
demic, in one degree or another, in every government throughout history. Where the 
corruption and mismanagement had a more profound effect was by the vacillation of the 
Qing government with the Tongzhi Restoration.  At times the government took a hands 
off approach and let regional officials advance their own pet projects as they saw fit. 
However, if the central government did step in, it was usually to shut something down 
rather to direct growth in burgeoning, but critical industries. Despite all of this, moderni-
zation remained the goal of the Tongzhi Restoration. 
An important distinction for the Tongzhi Restoration was that reform be carried 
out through a Confucian framework.  In essence, for the Confucianist effective govern-
ment is not brought about through institutional oversight, but by individuals. It comes 
from everyone in society, from the bottom up, acting in a moral way in their everyday 
life. If there is a Western parallel it would be something akin to Plato’s “Republic”.  And 
because morality in the Confucian world derives from outside of human existence, then 
even the Emperor is not about acting in a moral manner. Thus, the Emperor served an 
important cosmic function. Like a Pharaoh of Egypt who was in place to make sure 
Ma’at, the cosmic balance between mortal realm and the divine realm, was carried out 
thus the Emperor must act appropriately to keep the Mandate of Heaven. While this was 
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more a propaganda tool, an explanation of power like the Divine Right of Kings in West-
ern Europe, the concept of moral harmony in terms of “the Good” not just for the self but 
for the polis.  Without maintaining the Mandate of Heaven, calamity in the form of natu-
ral disasters, plagues of illness, even man made calamities such as rebellion or foreign 
invasion would be visited upon China.  Referred to as “Xiao” or filial piety, extended out 
from the family unit to the rest of the nation, and it was the foundation for Confucian eth-
ics.  Thus each person, theoretically, took on not only their family honor, but the honor 
of the nation itself.  It was felt that China had moved away from this notion of “Xiao” and 
the Reformers felt a restoration of this shared responsibility would extricate China from 
the crisis.  The embrace of military technology and scientific ideas was simply a tool. 
 The military reform aspect of the Tongzhi Restoration was dubbed, The Self 
Strengthening Movement.  It was a critical piece of the Tongzhi Restoration as a whole.  
Military reforms of the Restoration period were of two general types: 1) those aimed at giving 
armed forces of new types a suitable place in the Chinese domestic order, so as to heighten troop morale, 
ensure popular support for the army, and reinforce the loyalty to the Qing state developing regional mili-
tary forces; and (2) those aimed at making China the military equal, in arms and training, of the contem-
porary Westxii  
 
One of the first major issues tackled was the need for reorganization of the mili-
tary. One of the handicaps in terms of effectiveness was the feudalistic structure of the 
Qing military as a whole. Although the Qing had some centralized forces, the large part 
of their military structure was based around tribal alliances and feudalistic notions of loy-
alty.  Due the sheer size of the Chinese population and lack of strong foreign enemies, 
the Qing never had a need to revise this system. In fact, before the Taiping Rebellion, 
the Qing had managed simply by using their own limited centralized forces. But be-
cause of the length in terms of time, scale in terms of sheer numbers of people, and the 
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brutal nature of the civil conflict of the Taiping Rebellion, the central authority of the 
Qing eroded. Due to these factors, the Qing government began to rely more and more 
on regional forces. 
 Thus, regional forces became a necessity, and over time they exhibited a great 
deal of autonomy from the central authority of the Emperor.  In a short term conflict this 
would not have been as big of an issue, but in one that dragged on for close to fifteen 
years it was like a slow acid that dissolved the ability of the central authority effectively 
govern. This had to do with how these forces were organized and their recruitment 
methods.  Under the feudalistic model, a local commander selected his own officers us-
ing whatever criteria he felt appropriate. Further, most of the soldiers under his com-
mand were from his area or from his own clan if it was large enough.  This was not seen 
as a hindrance since it was felt that men with these ties would form a more cohesive 
unit and be more effective on the battlefield. 
There were other advantages, particularly in terms of pay:  
The new armies were supported by local revenues, independently of the central government.  
Pay and rations were generous—triple the normal standard of the time.  The battalion com-
mander was personally responsible for withholding a large portion of each man’s pay and sending 
it to his family at home.  The personal ties thus developed further encouraged a fighting spirit, be-
cause no one wanted to be ashamed to return home.xiii 
 
Unfortunately, reorganization initiatives after the end of the Taiping Rebellion 
failed to produce a centralized military force. In fact, what little remained of the Eight 
Banners, the pre-Qing military organization of the Manchu, were all but abandoned. Re-
gional commanders who’d gained influence and authority during the long civil war did 
not want to give it up.  This led to a trend that would stymie efforts even after the fall of 
the Qing government and give rise to warlords that plagued China for decades.   
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The Restoration leaders never found an answer to this dilemma. China was al-
ready hollowed out from the long slog of the Taiping Rebellion, and the Qing govern-
ment did not have the forces or political will to bring regional commanders to heel.  They 
only had the cultural notion of Confucian principles, which while the regional command-
ers paid lip service to, in practice it was an entirely different matter.  The Qing model 
suffered from the same issues many feudalistic models did with strong regional powers, 
and a weak central authority.  The theory was, the gentry who were literate men, would 
flock to the Emperor’s banners because it was their duty to do so.  In reality, this was 
because they owed their position to the Emperor who had granted it to them. However, 
during the Taiping Rebellion many of these regional powers had maintained their influ-
ence and power on their own.  But the emphasis on Confucian practices had been in 
place for thousands of years and letting them go, even through reform, simply was not 
going to happen. It was the only cultural framework they had to work from. 
Typically with virtue ethics individuals often serve as examples for others to strive 
for. One such example was Zeng Guofan. Guofan, a leading figure in military reorgani-
zation, had gained fame as a leader on the battlefield and held the reputation of a de-
vout Confucian scholar. He “repeatedly emphasized the moral character and training of 
the Confucian system as virtually the sole basis for the selection of officers.”xiv 
If a military leader did not display justice, humility, and vision, the troops would not obey him.  He 
must be scrupulously honest: “not a copper for private luxury; not an employee for personal rea-
sons.” He must rise early and follow a strict schedule; otherwise the business of the army would 
be neglected.xv 
 
For Zeng Guofan leading by example was not just a core moral principle but it 
was pragmatic. It served as a strong foundation for an effective military force. Top 
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down, from the Emperor to the lowest member of society, everyone would act in an ap-
propriate manner. While there were issues with the simplicity of assumptions in the 
Confucian worldview, and not more than a little bit of patronizing regarding those from 
the lower social strata, still it was not too far-fetched an idea if for nothing more than the 
reliance on the long cultural tradition Confucian morality and ethics held in high regard 
in China. There were still practical applications that were missing from this model re-
gardless of the Confucian mindset. 
Part of the issue from the outset was the absence of a corps of professionally 
trained officers at the field grade.  The new Western techniques and technologies was a 
heavy investment in terms of resources, and the implementation of these new methods 
placed a heavy emphasis on the mid-level commanders.  It also placed them in danger 
like never before, particularly in a military conflict. Under the Qing system officers were 
not directly in the line of fire. They were placed in the rear and issued commands based 
on a system of flags. The Western way was for the mid level officers to be closer to the 
front to issue commands to adjust to a chaotic and ever changing situation.  This was  a 
situation that Restoration reformers were never able to fully grapple with.  Effective reor-
ganization did not matter if there was no competent officer corps to lead it. 
This was the major drawback in the top down approach. While it accounted for 
future leaders to be lead by example it placed an emphasis on the wrong point, which 
should have been at the mid level. While the Confucian system was not utterly flawed in 
terms of its framework it was the synthesis of that ideology with new practices based on 
new technologies that proved to be too much of a challenge. Without an effective cen-
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tral authority and a trained efficient mid level corps of leaders, reorganization was ham-
strung before it even began; though the tools were there. 
 Under the old system, mandarins (who were scholar-bureaucrats) received vary-
ing degrees of training in all aspects of governance, and all were required to pass com-
prehensive tests based on Confucian ideas.  Thus, the incorporation of western meth-
odologies with Confucian principles was feasible. Even just in the strict military sense 
with modernized tactics, technologies, and upholding standards through good order and 
discipline Confucian principles were not out of step with these new goals. The idea of a 
pragmatic, but moral officer leading by example was not anything new to Chinese phi-
losophy. Perhaps the most famous dictums, or at least well known, stem from Sun Tzu’s 
The Art of War.  
 This was because there was not a structure in place that allowed capable, tal-
ented leaders, except under extraordinary circumstances, to rise through the ranks. This 
was because regional commanders typically selected men who were personally loyal to 
them and did not wish to see them rise beyond their current station.  Thus, development 
was spotty or entirely lacking. That is why a central authority, an institution that served 
the purposes of the state, was essential for the success of the Tongzhi Restoration. 
Without that essential building block in place the Self-Strengthening Movement failed to 
achieve any lasting impact. Some of the blame falls to the Dowager Empress, since she 
was at the top of the heap so to speak. Being more consistent and steady in her support 
of Prince Gong might have made a difference. Even an overhaul on the examination 
system and a modernization of the Eight Banners might have had an effect as well. But 
with the devastation wrought from the Taiping Rebellion and the double edged sword 
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that was accepting help from Western powers, the Tongzhi Restoration simply had too 
many factors working against it to achieve lasting success.  
There were efforts to bring oversight to regional armies.  An organization known 
as the Board of War was implemented and become the central military administration 
for the Qing government. Its function was oversight of the regional armies.  While it did 
attempt to introduce several measures over the regional commanders, it was hampered 
financially by the indemnity the Qing had to pay to the Western Powers, the cost of the 
Taiping rebellion, and the irregular flow of treasure up the logistical chain.  
Active conflict, especially a civil one does not make for an ideal situation to insti-
tute wide spread reforms no matter how necessary they might be.  In short, the econ-
omy of China simply hadn’t recovered significantly to give the Qing the necessary capi-
tal to implement reforms. To make matters worse the more prosperous regains were un-
der the control of the rebels.  Furthermore, collection methods were antiquated and inef-
fective. Thus, all decrees from the Board of War, especially demands for a full review of 
expenditures, went unheeded because there was no easy way to enforce them. The 
Qing central government needed the regional commanders more than they needed the 
Qing.  By 1868, the underlying message in the relationship between the regional com-
manders and the central Qing authority was clear: a national army derived from a cen-
tralized authority was out of the question.  When the Board of War ordered a review of 
all military expenditures from each province those orders went unheeded.   
However, the sole area of success for the Restoration was in the area of arma-
ment modernization if not necessarily its implementation. The use of modern weapons 
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tactics would be superfluous without the equipment to implement them, and China had 
seen first hand just how effective those armaments were when they were employed 
against them in the Second Opium War.  During that conflict the  Anglo-French expedi-
tionary force, with the assistance of American sailors, captured the Taku forts along the 
Peiho River which were held by Qing forces who outnumbered the Europeans signifi-
cantly. This gave the expeditionary force access to Beijing, but more importantly it ex-
posed the weaknesses in the Qing’s ability to resist European powers with their techno-
logical superiority.  The need to acquire these weapons was something both the Resto-
ration movement and the Conservative powers agreed upon. 
This was the one area that regionalism did not seem to hinder Restoration events 
as it had with the Board of War’s efforts at reorganization. Rather than simply purchas-
ing firearms from the Europeans, the Restoration leaders sought to create their own ad-
vancements, both through the construction of dockyards and manufacturing arms and 
munitions. 
 Tso Tsung-t-ang (Zuo Zongtang), who understood the importance of social, politi-
cal, and economic  reconstruction, wrote:  
“But from the standpoint of urgency, the casting of guns ranks first; and dredging   
  rivers, drilling wells, and manufacturing woolen cloth come next.”  Even Tseng Kuo-fan   
 (Zeng Guofan), who held the view that the conduct of war depended on men rather than on arms, 
 devoted some of his efforts to the modernization of arms.xvi 
 
A symbol of the success of the Tongzhi Restoration was the Kiangnan Arsenal.  
The official name was the General Bureau of Machine Manufacture of Kiangnan. The 
Kiangnan Arsenal served as both an arms manufacturing center and a shipyard.  Pro-
duction began at Kiangnan in 1865, the fourth year of the Self Strengthening Movement.  
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Located within the American concessions in Shanghai, the site was leased to the Qing 
government by the American Thomas Hunt & Company.  But Reformers were not 
simply interested in leasing the facility. Combining equipment from two older arsenals, 
the Anqing and Suzhou, the Qing government then secured workers and purchased the 
facility outright. 
 
Cooperation and Corruption: Failures from the West and China 
 The two men who were responsible for organizing the facility were Zeng Goufan, 
and Li Hongzhang.  Zeng Goufan developed the plans for the facility while Li 
Hongzhang actually ran the day to day operations as part of his duties as the Viceroy of 
Liangjiang.  Li envisioned a modern facility at Kiangnan.  The arsenal was tasked to 
manufacture Remington style, breeching loading firearms that would be used by the 
navy.  Li was a very hands on administer.  He personally interviewed foreign specialists 
based in Shanghai, and sought out their expertise in not only establishing the facility but 
training Chinese workers to eventually transition to run it independently.  For his part, 
Zuo Guofan worked on securing knowledge from abroad.  Zuo Guofan sent Yung Wing, 
a man with the distinction of being the first Chinese student to graduate from an Ameri-
can university, back to the United States to procure necessary equipment for the 
Kiangnan Arsenal.  While other Chinese facilities were created along a similar model 
Kiangnan was the most ambitious. 
The best proofs of the effectiveness of the Kiangnan Arsenal are the detailed reports of foreigners 
who inspected its accomplishments on the spot and who at the outset were certainly not preju-
diced in the Chinese favor.  In 1866 Li Hung-chang (Li Hongzhang) was described as having 
“enormous magazines,” “vast numbers” of rifles and guns, “arsenals which for extent may vie with 
those of the most powerful nations of Europe.”  In 1867, only two years after the founding of the 
Arsenal, the North China Herald stated: “It is now in such an efficient condition, that all the tools 
and machinery needed is manufactured in the shop.”  In 1868 the first modern-style gunboat built 
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by Chinese was successfully launched, and the construction for others was planned.xvii 
 
But even with the best of efforts from Li and Zuo the Kiangnan Arsenal failed to 
live up to expectations due to corruption and mismanagement.  It was not until 1868, 
that the Kiangnan Arsenal produced its first modern gunboat, but after calculating pro-
duction costs it was more than twice the amount it was simply to purchase a British ship 
of similar quality. With firearms it was even worse. It was not until 1871, that Kiangnan 
produced a breech loading Remington style rifle, and by 1873 the arsenal had only pro-
duced a several thousand which was wholly inadequate to the needs of the Qing armed 
forces.  To make matters worse the rifles produced at Kiangnan Arsenal were of an infe-
rior quality to the American made Remington.  
Part of the reason for the Kiangnan Arsenal not living up to expectations was a 
lack of proper oversight. Li Hongzhang was a Reformer with vision but he also had 
other obligations as the Viceroy of Liangjiang.  He was not able to fully devote his atten-
tion to the arsenal and relied on subordinates who did not have the same ability as him.  
He also played a dual role as civil administrator and military commander as did many 
Qing government officials of his rank.  In 1866, when the Nian Rebellion kicked off in the 
provinces of Henan and Shandong Li Hongzhang was dispatched to suppress it. 
While cost overruns contributed to the failure at Kiangnan, they also had to deal 
with an antiquated infrastructure and logistical supply lines of raw materials that simply 
could not support the undertaking.  The infrastructure was also in bad shape due to the 
Taiping rebellion in the south, then followed by the Nian Rebellion in the north. Add in 
the graft and mismanagement both from the Europeans who assisted in managing the 
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facility, many who had overestimated their expertise or simply lied about their creden-
tials, and the Qing officials who lacked the expertise to oversee the operations it led up 
to Kiangnan underperforming.  
 Even with all of its negatives for a time Kiangnan was the largest modern arsenal 
in Asia. And even with all the challenges it faced, both in production and the acquisition 
of raw materials, it demonstrated that Europeans and the Chinese could work together 
in modernizing China. Combined with the advances in education at the Foochow Ship-
yard where Chinese students received naval training in engineering and navigation 
alongside French and English proved that East-West cooperation even with some sput-
ters and spurts was possible. Given time and refinement it might be effective. 
 Unfortunately, there was a lot of mistrust of the Europeans’ motives. While it was 
not unfounded, the pervasive nature of it is misleading. There were certainly bad apples 
in the barrel, and the Europeans did not always treat the Chinese fairly in treaties but 
many Europeans who worked with the Chinese day to day did want to see them suc-
ceed and share in that success. This was due to a morally complicated impulse to “civi-
lize” other cultures that were seen as less developed. Open markets, even if they were 
made so by force, took on an important role even if one of those goods was opium from 
India.  And even when the Qing government attempted to combat opium addiction, the 
British insisted that its sale continue. However, there were some officials who not only 
sought to help the Chinese with their transition but wanted to end the unequal treaties 
as well.  
 One success story was the Chinese Maritime Customs Service.  Established by 
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the British during the Taping Rebellion, the Chinese Maritime Service Service was un-
der the direction and control of the Qing government.  It was staffed by foreigners at the 
senior administrative level, and while it employed men from all the Europeans powers it 
was primarily British in make up. The goal was for the Maritime Service to collect taxes 
and fees that were going unpaid.  It wasn’t altogether altruistic since those taxes went to 
the pay for indemnities, but it was to also to stabilize marketplace of which shipping was 
a chief concern especially to the British.     
 From April 1863, under the first inspector general Horatio Nelson Lay, the annual 
collection of taxes was just over eight million taels; the silver based currency used by 
the Qing.  By 1885, under the stewardship of Robert Hart, perhaps the most well known 
inspector general of the Chinese Maritime Service, the annual collection of duties and 
fees had almost doubled to fifteen million.  Through this revenue collection the Qing was 
able to pay off, in full, not only the indemnities imposed on China from the Treaty of 
Tientsin in 1860, but it also generated the funds to finance the Kiangnan Arsenal, the 
Foochow Shipyard, and send Chinese students to attend European and American uni-
versities. Inspector Hart even submitted other proposals beyond simply those which 
pertained to the Chinese Maritime Service. He was eager to assist the Qing in organiz-
ing the naval fleet, establishing a post office, and a national mint. He also became per-
sonal friends with Prince Gong during his time as head of the Zongli Yamen, the faction 
of Reformers. For his service Robert Hart was lauded with awards, honorific titles both 
from the Qing and the British for his distinguished service in China. 
Historian Mary C. Wright argued that Confucian ethics was the main cause for 
the failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement.  This is self evident since Confucianism 
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was part of the cultural fabric of China and had been so for close to two millennia.  But 
this explanation is a bit too simple and ultimately misses the point. While ideas do play a 
role, it is people who are the make or break, success or failure of the implementation of 
those ideas. Without execution those ideas are merely words on a page. While they can 
move people, they do not have an impact outside of action taken. For the Reformers of 
the Tongzhi Restoration it was a structure, one that was receptive to those who did the 
day to day work, but was flexible enough to permit implementation of new ideas. It was 
not so much the philosophy itself but the feudal structure that came along with Confu-
cianism that hampered the reform movement. As Pao Chao Hsieh writes in The Gov-
ernment of China (1644-1911): 
The Manchu monarchs were wise enough to elevate their position and concentrate their power at 
the same time.  Huang Chao Wen Hsien Tung Kao bears witness to this point in a short passage:  
 
From the grand secretaries and ministers of the six departments down to an insignificant clerk in 
the remote corner of the empire, appointment or dismissal, reward or punishment, is all given di-
rectly by the emperor himself.  This has never been practiced by rulers heretofore. 
The elevation of position coupled with the concentration of power made the Manchu Emperors 
more like oriental despots than their predecessors.xviii 
Thus, Prince Gong retained his position, technically, by the Dowager Empress, 
and was subsequently dismissed when it proved politically expedient.  In fact, the rea-
son she was in her position at all was on the part of the belligerent faction. While it 
might be easy to simply dismiss the failure of the reform movement from its own internal 
failings, external pressures from foreign powers did not do it any favors. However the 
realm of ideas, specifically the issues of territorial integrity for China, and a notion of 
fairness failed in parallel fashion alongside the Self Strengthening Movement. 
 
  
35 
CHAPTER 3 
OFF THE HINGES: THE OPEN DOOOR IN CHINA 
   The acquisition of the Philippines was not the event that brought China to 
the attention of American entrepreneurs. In fact, American businessmen had been in 
China right around the time of the founding of the United States. What changed was the 
way the US government dealt with China. Before the acquisition of the Philippines, the 
US government took a hands off approach to dealing with China. This limited the ways 
in which American entrepreneurs were able to conduct business putting them at a sig-
nificant disadvantage after the Treaty of Nanjing. It meant they were largely on their 
own, or if they were fortunate enough they operated underneath the umbrella of the Brit-
ish or other European power. These American operators came to be known as the “Old 
China Hands” by the US government and were at times called upon to assist American 
diplomats on how to navigate the very unfamiliar cultural framework of the Chinese. 
This situation changed, though gradually, once the United States acquired the Philip-
pines. However, gunboat diplomacy in China was out. Most of the US Navy consisted of 
old, outdated wooden hulled ships, and President Roosevelt’s “Great White Fleet” voy-
age around the world did not take place until the end of 1907. So what was needed was 
a way for the United States to both enter the influence game in China, but to not appear 
to rock the boat too much. A further complication was while Manifest Destiny on the 
North American continent was popular enough American imperialism overseas was a 
horse of another color. The United States needed a way to enter the game, but to not 
appear threatening.  It needed to expand its power base just to maintain the posses-
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sions it already had. Things began to change once the United States became an impe-
rial power.  The strategy for this was The Open Door. 
  The Open Door started as a series of notes by President McKinley’s Secretary of 
State John Hay.  Written in 1899 – 1900, it argued that the path of geo-political domi-
nance in Asia was through China. “The storm center of the world has shifted… to China.  
Whoever understands that mighty Empire… has a key to world politics for the next five 
centuries,” Hay wrote.xix  Even in the center of the storm the winds were shifting rapidly.  
In 1895, the island nation of Japan, who had less than thirty years prior lived in a pri-
marily feudalistic, agrarian society defeated the Chinese on the issue of hegemony over 
Korea. This left the other European powers, namely Russia and Germany, scrambling 
to see who was going to gobble up the largest slice of pie from this upheaval. However, 
the United States was not even on the board in 1895, since the acquisition of the Philip-
pines was another three years away along with the annexation of Hawaii in 1898, which 
put them halfway to Asia. The China question loomed on the horizon. 
 Still, the US was in a position of weakness thrown into a mercurial situation that 
constantly shifted from the start. Even the wording of the Open Door had to be crafted in 
such a way as to not tip the balance too far in any direction.  Already, opportunities for 
American businessmen, especially in the major concerns of mining and railroad con-
struction, were extremely limited.  Thus, the US turned to their most stalwart ally, one 
who shared a common heritage: Great Britain.  All things considered the British were 
not bad allies to have in China.  “Up to (this) time the British had been overwhelming 
master of the Chinese trade.  They had 80 per cent of it; all the rest of the countries to-
gether, including ourselves (US), had only 20 per cent.”xx  Even before the Open Door 
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officially came into effect the US and Great Britain paid at least lip service, if not actual 
shared actual policy goals. They sought equal opportunities, at least for themselves, in 
trade. They both wished to develop potential commercial markets, and wanted to see 
the Qing retain their territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Open Door simply put into 
writing what had been standard practice between each nation and further sought to 
spread it among the other powers in China. Unfortunately Hay’s “Open Door” was not in 
step with the times in China. Even though lip service was paid to the concept of the 
Open Door by the close of the 19th century, the spheres of influence in China began to 
harden, and with the Qing government increasingly becoming more and more unstable 
it was a matter of time before the situation broke down. As historian Paul Holbo notes: 
“The tempo of the imperialist race quickened in 1897.  Germany seized Kiaochow in the    
 Shantung Province, France acquired territory in south China, and Russia occupied Port Arthur    
  and appeared ready to take all of Manchuria from China.  Great Britain joined the scramble by  
 securing leases of Weihaiwei as a naval base and Kowloon as a port, while she and the other  
  power concluded agreements on investments in China.”xxi  
 
Military force, not diplomacy, was the go to response in China. In fact, Hay might 
look like a misguided idealist, but in fact the opposite is true. Hay understood the inher-
ent limitations of the American use of force in China, and what the potential ratifications 
might be for for disrupting other powers’ spheres of influence. But Hay still sought to 
turn to the tide, to find some glimmer of hope that the the situation might turn around. 
Thus, Hay received cordial replies on his “Open Door” concept, but the point of no re-
turn was crossed. Cooperation had turned to competition and conflict. His friend Henry 
Adams told him “Your open door is already off its hinges.”xxii  It was a respected theory 
but not one that the other powers wanted to chance putting into practice even if they 
made public shows of deference supporting the notion. Hay lamented “the inherent 
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weakness of our position is this: we do not want to rob China ourselves, and our public 
opinion will not permit us to interfere, with an army.  The talk of the paper about ‘our 
preeminent moral position giving us the authority to dictate to the world’ is mere flap-
doodle.”xxiii  By the time of his death in 1905, Hay thought he had achieved no lasting 
success in China.  But was the Open Door a misconceived notion, a conjuration of wish-
ing thinking and hopeful intentions? It was not, at least not completely. In fact, there 
were signs that such cooperation was possible and would have to be achieved if the 
current situation were to have any hope holding in China.  
 In June of 1900, an uprising known as the Boxer Rebellion, broke out among the 
bottom echelon of Chinese society. Known as the Yihetuan Movement, the rebellion 
was both proto-nationalistic and anti-foreign in its make up. Not specifically targeted 
against the spheres of influence the Boxers took aim at the Christian missionaries along 
with all other foreigners. Although religion was a rallying cry it was not the underlying 
factor. After a particularly harsh drought famine had grabbed the country and along with 
it the superstructure of the Chinese economy which had started to shift from an agrarian 
to a more industrialized one.  One example of the change was transportation of goods 
which had been performed by porters along rivers and drovers with wagons along roads 
was now handled by locomotives on rails.  
 Add to the mix the deleterious relationship between the Qing and the foreign 
powers due to the unequal treaties the situation was a powder keg in want of a spark. 
Where the cooperation came into play, at least among the foreign powers, was during 
the rebellion itself.  After the Boxers besieged Peking they murdered the German and 
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Japanese ministers. But besides foreigners, the Boxers also began to slaughter Chi-
nese Christian converts by the thousands. At that point, the public shifted support away 
from the Boxers and to the foreign powers who could establish some order.  Two 
months after the rebellion began, an allied force arrived in Peking on August 14th, 1900. 
Its goal was to rescue the besieged Peking litigation.  While short lived, the Boxer Re-
bellion showed that the foreign powers could act in mutual accord and further gain some 
sort of public support from the Chinese.  During the crisis Sec. of State Hay sent a note 
to Edwin H. Conger, the American minister to China, to “’act concurrently with the other 
powers’ in restoring order and protecting the lives and property of (America’s) nationals 
and ‘all legitimate American interests.’  In its concluding sentence, however, it added to 
this purpose a momentous new objective, namely, ‘to seek a solution which may bring 
about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and adminis-
trative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international 
law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all part of 
the Chinese Empire.”xxiv  The Open Door had arrived in China. 
 
Leave the Stick at the Door: Roosevelt’s Realist Policies 
  The Open Door was an ideological framework that was unique to China. Territo-
rial integrity was a buzzword of the day. Even a concept given credence in the abstract, 
the reality was that foreign powers still carved up China into their respective spheres of 
influence. And they were increasingly hardening. They were naturally suspicious of any 
kind of outside mediation even from other powers. “’In this Manchurian matter,’ Roose-
velt wrote in 1903 ‘we are not striving for any political control or to help any nation with 
  
40 
any political control or to prevent Russia from acquiring any political control of the terri-
tory in question.’”xxv  Ironically, it was the commitment to maintaining the territorial integ-
rity of China that did not win the United States any friends amongst the other powers. In 
fact, it was seen as a power move, a check to keep others from gaining any more power 
so the United States could gain its own. However, it was this position that became the 
foundational building block of institutional American foreign policy.  A realist position that 
evolved over time into an idealist position which came about from the limitations of 
power and what could be accomplished in China. 
  Americans who understood the American position in China, Conger, Hay, and 
Root after him grasped the importance of the territorial integrity clause.  “They (Conger 
and Hay) had taken it for granted that foreign spheres of influence and territorial con-
cessions in China would continue to exist, and even to expand….  But the circum-
stances attending the Boxer Rebellion, following the unfavorable reception of the Sep-
tember (1900) notes, led Hay to the conclusion that the maintenance of the open door in 
depended on the maintenance of China’s complete sovereignty over her own territo-
ries.”xxvi  Even though the insistence of the territorial integrity might bring cause the 
other powers to distrust the United States, the effect of the hardening of the spheres of 
influence meant that American businessmen were closed off from markets. Without that 
economic power from their entrepreneurs, that meant the US lost one of its biggest for-
eign policy advantages.  This was crucial considering the aggressive moves of Japan 
who had its own ambitions for a Pan-Asian sphere of hegemony. This was all the more 
impressive since Japan was a newcomer to the imperial scene, as was the United 
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States. The irony being that, it was the US who forced Japan to open to the wider world.  
 
Don’t Look Directly at the Rising Sun: Japan plays the Great Game Well  
In February of 1854, Commodore Matthew C. Perry was ordered to sail for Ja-
pan. This was his second trip.  A year prior on July 14th, 1853, Perry had presented a 
letter from President of the United States Millard Filmore along with a white flag of sur-
render to the Japanese delegates. In addition to the letter Commodore Perry had put on 
a display of the firepower of the Paixhans guns that fired explosive shells. After such a 
not so subtle threat the Japanese delegation had agreed to meet in a year. Japan, the 
island nation which had sealed itself off from the rest of the world was about to be 
opened up by force.xxvii  The Shogun, the de-facto head of the Japanese government 
had no choice but to agree to the United States’ terms. When Perry returned to Japan 
he signed the Convention of Kanagawa on behalf of the United States on March 31st, 
1854. Japan was now open to the outside world, but unlike China it would not be sub-
jected to carving up and spheres of influence. In fact, just fifty years after going from a 
feudalistic society it would defeat a Great Power though one in decline.  Thus, the 
United States seeking to expand markets for their own entrepreneurs unwittingly served 
as the catalyst for Japan to modernize quick, fast, and in a hurry both in terms of eco-
nomic industrialization and military effectiveness. 
  A major milestone, a break from the past, came about during the era of what 
was known as the Meiji Restoration which was officially recognized in 1868. This placed 
the reins of power back in the hands of the Japanese Emperor Meiji from the its previ-
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ous holder the Tokugawa Shogun. In less than thirty years the Meiji government over-
saw a rapid pace of not only technological development but aggressive expansion. In 
1895, the Japanese defeated a weakened China to gain concessions in Korea and ten 
years after that defeated Russia. Even after the conflict in 1905, the Russian and Japa-
nese had tensions in Manchuria as both powers sought to protect their own interests.  
The Open Door while a declaration of neutrality in many ways was also a way for Japan 
to work with a potential ally. Both McKinley’s successor Teddy Roosevelt along with his 
Secretary of State Elihu Root viewed the Japanese in similar vein. Even if the United 
States and Japan were not possible allies the Japanese were at least worthy of respect.  
 For Roosevelt the Japanese were an exception. Like many of his contemporar-
ies Roosevelt held Asians were lesser than Anglo-Saxon based nations but even the 
Japanese were to be counted among great powers in his estimation. “’The Japs interest 
me and I like them,’ he wrote his British friend Spring Rice.  To another friend he called 
the Japanese ‘a wonderful and civilized people’ who were ‘entitled to stand on an abso-
lute equality with all the other peoples of the civilized world.’  What impressed him was 
Japan’s energy, technical prowess, culture, industrial achievement, and growing military 
strength.  Japan, like America, was in a heroic phase of political and economic develop-
ment.”xxviii  While somewhat wistful, if patronizing, this was also a politically expedient 
view as well. The British had come to view Japan as an ally, a check against Germany 
who was growing in power throughout Europe and the world. Since Roosevelt favored 
the British, the Japanese became favored as well. While Roosevelt respected the Japa-
nese, he was hamstrung domestically due to virulent racism and anti-immigration senti-
ment at home in America. On May 6th, 1882, The Chinese Exclusion Act passed into 
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law. An anti-immigration policy that made exceptions for skilled labor and labor related 
to mining. It also went a step further and stated that any Chinese person who was in the 
United States after the passage of the law had to reapply for admission. This presented 
Chinese immigrants, most of which were men, with a very difficult choice. They could 
either stay in the United States and never see their families again, or go back to China 
and most likely never be allowed back into the United States. In effect, Chinese men 
who made up most of the immigrants to the United States had to make the choice of 
staying in America and never seeing their families again or going back to China but 
never coming back to the United States.  Legislation was passed against Japanese im-
migrants as well after Japan began to rise in prominence. It was these racial tensions, 
the fear of the “Yellow Peril” at home, counterbalanced with the need for allies in the Pa-
cific that Roosevelt had to balance. It was the juggling act of respect for a worthy power 
even if the nation’s domestic policies were outright hostile and even shameful to that 
foreign power. While Roosevelt understood this notion it was a lesson the Russians 
would learn very soon.    
 
A Sign of Things to Come: The Russo-Japanese War  
   On February 8, 1904, the Japanese launched a surprise night attack on Port Ar-
thur badly damaging three of the Russian Empire’s heaviest cruisers in the Eastern 
fleet.  Although the Japanese admiral Tōgō Heihachirō was unable to successfully cap-
ture Port Arthur, attack provided a distraction for the Japanese to land troops near In-
cheon on the Korean peninsula.  The conflict, which came to be known as the Russo-
Japanese war, ultimately ended with a Japanese victory.  More importantly, it shifted the 
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balanced of power in Manchuria and was the spark that led to a weakening of absolute 
authority held by the Czar of Russia Nicholas II.  While the United States as a nominal 
ally of Japan, the realist foreign policy goal for Roosevelt was for Japan to come out on 
top of Russia by just enough. Where Roosevelt performed a foreign policy coup was by 
the United States inserting itself into the peace process between Russia and Japan. By 
doing this the United States cloaked itself in the garb of the disinterested player. Roose-
velt put his presidency on the line and in doing so earned himself a Noble Peace Prize.  
Through back channel diplomacy Roosevelt, with the help of his Secretary of War How-
ard Taft, brought about the Treaty of Portsmouth.  Out of this settlement the United 
States gained some desperately need prestige as a peacemaker, particularly Roosevelt, 
in China.  Unfortunately, it would not last.   
This was the end of the road for any gains the United States could make using 
the Open Door and back channel diplomacy in China.  Tensions and territorial ambitions 
began to take precedence over any faux posturing on territorial integrity toward China.  
Although the Russians and the Japanese were bitter enemies they would join forces 
three years later to shut out the US from meddling in Manchuria.  By the time of the 
Root–Takahira Agreement in 1908, the United States was in a weakened position.  Alt-
hough the agreement reaffirmed China’s territorial integrity, recognized the Philippines 
and Hawaii as American possessions, the United States recognized Japan’s interest in 
Korea and Manchuria.  Japan’s position was strengthened in China and there was no 
turning back.  The Open Door had closed.  In a letter to his successor, President Taft, 
Roosevelt remarked. “The ‘open-door’ policy in China was an excellent thing, and will I 
hope be a good thing in the future, so far as it can be maintained by general diplomatic 
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agreement; but as has been proved by the whole history of Manchuria, alike under Rus-
sia, and under Japan, the ‘open-door’ policy, as a matter of fact, completely disappears 
as soon as a powerful nation determines to disregard it, and is willing to run the risk of 
war rather than forego its intention.”xxix 
Although it failed to achieve its stated objectives, the Open Door formed the ba-
sis of American foreign policy in China and served as an ideological framework as the 
United States moved forward as an imperial power.  The ideas of free international 
trade and territorial integrity would evolve into self-determination and the spread of de-
mocracy after World War I.  What was a realist political document became an idealist 
policy for Presidents after Roosevelt. However, the institutional and diplomatic accom-
plishments have been overshadowed by the men who both rode and brought about a 
shift in the direction of American imperialism. Roosevelt and Taft both had similar ideas, 
but stark personality contrasts which ultimately lead to conflict. Even still, it was Dollar 
Diplomacy that was tried and failed to produce results in China. 
 
The Taft Justification: Transition and Tumult for the US in China 
“The Diplomacy of the present administration has sought to respond to modern 
ideas of commercial intercourse.  This policy has been characterized as substituting dol-
lars for bullets.  It is one that appeals alike to idealistic humanitarian sentiments, to the 
dictates of sound policy, and to legitimate commercial aims.”  This was the heart of 
President Taft’s farewell address to a joint session of Congress on December 3rd, 1912.  
It is the phrase “substituting dollar for bullets” which has become shortened and coined 
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in the phrase “dollar diplomacy”. It is also the phrase that has summed up for historians 
the Taft Administration’s foreign policy in China.  It is usually not a kindly critique. Part 
apologia and part idealistic overreach, Taft’s “Dollar Diplomacy” conjures up images of 
miscalculation, diplomatic naivety, especially regarding China and the power of the 
“Open Door” and outright, abject failure. The scale is weighted even more so because 
Taft’s foreign policy successes are contrasted against his more successful predecessor 
President Theodore “Teddy” Roosevelt. But while “Dollar Diplomacy” was unsuccessful 
in achieving its goals in China, it did lay the basis for what would be the future of Ameri-
can foreign policy specifically the use of financial capital to achieve geopolitical aims. 
From the beginning the Taft Administration’s foreign policy efforts were ham-
pered both by a flawed abstract idealism, which when implemented into reality wasn’t 
mitigated by experienced operatives.  However, it is important to keep in mind that the 
United States as a global power was still less than a generation old.  And given that 
China was a pressure cooker that was boiling over with new, more imperial inclined 
players such as Germany and Japan, it is easy to see how a young imperial power not 
yet accustomed to playing the game would be a challenge for any President.  
While recent scholarship has humanized President Roosevelt he’s still a semi-
legendary figure that has become part of the American Mythos.  His face is carved on 
the side of Mount Rushmore. He has been the subject of books, artwork, and movies. 
He has a popular children’s toy that still bears his name: the Teddy bear.  Teddy Roose-
velt is an icon of Americana. Taft, a one term president with very few monuments, is 
known for being a very large man who once got stuck in a bathtub (He actually did not).  
The comparison is hardly a fair one considering the flow of events in Asia would have 
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been a tough for any American President to contend with. However, Roosevelt did have 
some advantages over his groomed successor. Roosevelt had a natural charisma and 
boundless energy which made him a natural statesman and diplomat. In a career filled 
with numerous examples perhaps his most memorable one was brokering a peace 
agreement between Russia and Japan in 1905 for a cessation of hostilities ending 
Russo-Japanese war. This earned him a Nobel Peace Prize. He would follow up that 
success again in a year, 1906,  by meditating another conflict between France and Ger-
many over Morocco. 
In contrast, Taft largely stayed out of the affairs of an increasingly tense Europe. 
By the time a second crisis happened in Morocco in 1911, Taft was not personally in-
volved. He did support efforts to meditate a crisis between Italy and Turkey.  Because of 
Taft’s tendency to not involve himself personally in European affairs he is judged as be-
ing somewhat of a foreign policy dilettante. However, Taft did have diplomatic interests 
in other regions of the globe specifically Latin America and the Far East.  And it is in 
these two regions of the world the US could not have been more vastly different. In 
South America thanks to the Monroe Doctrine and shifting economic power the US op-
erated with mostly a free hand. In China however, it was late to the party and jumping 
into a game that in which the more established players already had designs of their 
own. 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, the Great Powers were stuck between old 
ways of thinking and new technological advances that spurred not only growth, but new 
ideas. It was during this tumultuous time that America joined the “Great Game” in China. 
The foundation of America’s foreign policy was based on the Monroe Doctrine, but up 
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until that point besides a few isolated incidents the United States was not considered a 
colonial power. With a continent to territorially expand upon and an aversion toward 
large military expenditures especially in the wake of the Civil War, the United States 
was still very much a North American power.  However, the Monroe Doctrine was a 
handy document. It was used as a pretext during the Spanish American War which re-
sulted in the United States gaining possession of two former Spanish Colonies, one in 
the Caribbean, Puerto Rico, and the other in the Far East, the Philippines. President 
McKinley while giving independence to Cuba decided to hang onto the Philippines and 
Puerto Rico. And the man who McKinley wanted to run this enterprise was William H. 
Taft. Taft was a man of very limited diplomatic and foreign policy experience.  Up to this 
point in his life Taft’s focus was strictly in the legal profession particularly as a judge.  
His passion for the law formed the basis for how Taft saw the world and it was one he 
would return to again and again.   
  When selected as Chairman of the Philippine Commission by President McKin-
ley, Taft was a judge in the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth District. At first, Taft 
declined the posting stating he wished to stay a judge. However, both McKinley and Taft 
were part of the Ohio Republicans power block which was comprised of a lot of Civil 
War veterans. A combination of familial pressure, personal ambition, and McKinley’s as-
surance that Taft would be gone no longer than a year Taft relented and made plans to 
leave for the Philippines.xxx   
 In June of 1900, Taft arrived in the Philippines. Rather than a year, Taft stayed 
close to four years departing in February of 1904. While there were some scandals from 
the American Occupation of the Philippines, Taft’s tenure as Chairman of the Philippine 
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Commission was relatively popular.  He was given wide latitude on the development of 
civil services. Through the Philippine Commission Taft set up a court system, created 
multiple bureaus which included Mining, Census, Health, Forestry, and an Inspector of 
Customs. This was in line with President McKinley in creating a new government, one 
based on the American model, for the Philippines. It was quintessential nation building, 
but the possession of the Philippines had a more profound effect for the change in 
American foreign policy and the course of the nation one in which would be lead by 
McKinley’s predecessor.  
  American foreign policy in the Far East was almost nonexistent before the Roo-
sevelt Administration. That is not to say there was no foreign policy, but the approach by 
the United States was “hands off”.  Part of this was lack of political, or wide spread eco-
nomic interest, and the other was simply logistics. Having no sphere of influence, or na-
val might to carve one out let alone the national interest in imperialism, the Far East, 
specifically China, was a low priority at best. Prior to McKinley and the Spanish Ameri-
can War the United States government focused mainly on continental matters specifi-
cally westward expansion and the wars with Native Americans. Even during Roosevelt’s 
time this hands off approach persisted. Roosevelt’s US Minister to China, William Rock-
hill, was notorious for refusing to assist American businessmen in commercial enter-
prises in China. American commerce was conducted by “Old China Hands”, entrepre-
neurs who had carved a niche for themselves, and often acted under the preview of the 
British spheres of influence.  
 At the turn of the century China was at the center of world changing events. In 
1895, China lost in a conflict with the emerging great power Japan.  This was over the 
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“Korea question”. Japan was forced to give up access. China was defeated by the Japa-
nese in 1895 to settle the Korean question, but in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan was 
forced by Germany, France, and Russia, known as the “Triple Intervention” to give up 
access to the Liaodong Peninsula.  While France and Germany nominally checked Ja-
pan’s influence, an ally of Britain, it was Russian interference on the Liaodong Penin-
sula, along with Russia’s occupation of Port Arther, in the years after the First Sino-Jap-
anese war of 1895 that led to hostilities between them in the Russo Japanese War.  The 
conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War was the definitive statements that things had 
changed in Asia. If American politicians were slow to wake up to the new realities of an 
imperial foreign policy, the American public was less inclined.  
In less than a decade, a strong, anti-imperial sentiment developed from a politi-
cally considerable portion of the American public. A famous example was Mark Twain 
who turned rom being a “red hot imperialist” to passionately anti-imperialist so much so 
he joined the American Anti-Imperialist League and became its Vice President.  While 
Americans were generally in favor of westward expansion on the North American conti-
nent the establishment and maintenance through blood and treasure of an overseas 
empire was not a terribly popular notion. Because of this, Roosevelt, already somewhat 
of an Anglophile, cultivated closer ties with England. Through the British, Roosevelt 
hoped to gain an ally who would, nominally at least, defend American interests. And 
while Roosevelt did not want the United States to appear to be Britain’s lapdog, he 
hoped to accomplish this aim by having England support the Open Door. The plan 
made sense on paper considering England was the preeminent imperial power in Asia, 
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if not the world. While Taft did not necessarily disagree with Roosevelt, he wanted to go 
in a different direction.  
Contained within the Open Door was the belief that the driving force of imperial-
ism was through capitalism, at least for Americans. It was the balance sheet, not the 
barrel of the gun that would drive changes among different cultures. And these markets 
could only function if they were backed by the rule of law, and that rule was enforced 
through the establishment of a court system and treaties. This was the paradigm that 
would form the genesis of institutional US foreign policy in the decades to come in the 
21st century.  The US Government was not so concerned with the spread of democ-
racy, although it was believed this was the best government for capitalism to thrive in. 
Rather, it was the opening of new commercial ventures, and creating space within exist-
ing markets for American entrepreneurs to find those opportunities.  If there was to be 
an imperialism for the US it would inevitability have to contain that element within it. This 
was not surprising because it was the rapidly expanding and modernizing American 
economy that led to changes in how America conducted foreign policy. 
A key provision of American foreign policy was business investment in the twenti-
eth century. Up to this point public investment, those made by the government directly, 
was not a fixture of US foreign policy. In fact, US foreign policy, in terms of power pro-
jection, was in its infancy so at first it was the government trying to carve out space for 
American businessmen in creating abstract notions of capitalism among imperial pow-
ers who were very much in favor of monopolies and closed markets.  Also, there was 
unease about lending private money directly to unstable foreign government. This was 
altogether too common an occurrence in former Spanish colonies in South America. 
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And although the Qing government of China made payments on any loans and indemni-
ties peeved against it from the Boxer Rebellion, the instability of Qing’s China was a 
cause for concern.  However, things had changed and the US took a more active role in 
encouraging foreign investment.  Roosevelt used his personal charm and the power of 
the presidency.  In 1898, when J.P. Morgan wished to sell his shares in the American 
Development Company which had the commission to build a railroad from Canton to 
Hankow, President Roosevelt personally asked Morgan to reconsider.xxxi  President Taft 
would go a step further than Roosevelt.  Under Taft, the United States government 
would back loans made by private entities for investments or loans made to foreign gov-
ernments, specifically enterprises in China.  It was this guarantee that was the heart of 
Dollar Diplomacy. While the guarantee often looked a lot like Gunboat Diplomacy, the 
key difference was the US government did not lead with that, at least not in China 
where it was strategically impractical. The hope was that the US government and Amer-
ican business would work for a common purpose. The expansion, or inclusion in the 
marketplace by American businessmen would naturally lead to establishment of democ-
racy which would in turn yield a greater share of the marketplace and so forth. Before 
the Open Door and Dollar Diplomacy, US foreign policy was more limited in scope since 
the US government had focused interests on the continent. American foreign invest-
ment was largely left on its own, but now they were partnered together, nominally, push-
ing forward with a singular purpose.  
The purpose of Dollar Diplomacy, from the point of view of the US Government, 
was to to stabilize under developed, i.e. “backward”, nations into something resembling 
more modern nations, i.e. democracies with open markets and free trade at least toward 
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American exports. While Taft had some experience in nation building given his experi-
ences in the Philippines, the man tasked with the job was Philander C. Knox, Taft’s Sec-
retary of State. Taft could not have picked a worse man for the position.  Philander C. 
Knox wasn’t a neophyte to the government, having served as Teddy Roosevelt’s Attor-
ney General, but his mentality was more an attorney than a diplomat.  This actually was 
a preference for Taft whose cabinet was made of up over half of men from the legal pro-
fession. 
 Not only was Knox a gifted attorney, he was considered one of the best in the na-
tion. Like many men Knox moved back and forth between private practice and public 
service. Knox made his fortune in corporate law, did work for the Carnegie Steel Com-
pany, and was a key player in the organization of what became US Steel.  This was af-
ter his anti-trust work under Roosevelt. But the same qualities that made him an excel-
lent attorney worked against him as a diplomat.  As an attorney, Knox advocated 
strongly for his client as the legal profession is inherently adversarial.  Taking that same 
mindset with him as Secretary of State he treated the US like a client.  He was known 
for not giving an inch in negotiations and had no time for the tedium that comes along 
with the pomp and ceremony associated with diplomacy.  Opinions about Knox from for-
eign dignitaries were universal.  He was cold, immovable, and easily insulted, or con-
cerned over trivialities as lawyers can be with contracts.  He and his wife were not fond 
of social scenes where much of the foundation for diplomatic work was laid. To make 
matters worse, Knox did not enjoy favorable relations with his former colleagues of the 
Senate. He was known to be prickly, was not receptive to the suggestions made by 
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other Senators, and did not do the personal legwork or backroom glad handing to en-
sure smooth legislative passage of important treaties.xxxii And like his boss, President 
Taft, Knox was not known for his tireless work ethic. Often the day to day running of 
State was left in the hands of Knox’s First Assistant Secretary Francis Huntington-Wil-
son.  
If Knox was a terrible diplomat due to his mindset and work ethic, Francis Hun-
tington-Wilson was not much of an improvement, much of which was due to his temper-
ament.  He had the unfortunate combination of being able to antagonize people with 
ease and of being easily offended himself.  He was also suspicious by nature bordering 
on the point of paranoia. On a 1910 trip to Turkey, he covered the window panes over 
the door to his room in the American Legation with blue paper.xxxiii  While this might not 
seem odd in day and age with cyber warfare and flying drones, the staff at the legation 
made a note of it due specifically based on the oddity of the scene.  However, for all his 
faults as a diplomat two things that Huntington-Wilson did possess was a desire to ad-
vocate for American interests abroad, and he was exceptionally gifted with outstanding 
organizational abilities.  So it was the man who made it a habit to constantly look over 
his shoulder for eavesdroppers whenever he was in a conversation no matter how cas-
ual, was also the one who turned the State Department from a playground of political 
appointees into a modern, professional diplomatic corps.  
 Ironically, given the almost free reign from his disinterested boss Huntington-Wil-
son introduced a slew of reforms upon his appointment. First, he significantly increased 
the size of the department by hiring more personnel.  Next, he instituted changes to the 
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workload and how information was communicated within the department. He then re-
vamped the hiring standards and introduced an in service training program that lasted 
over a month.  For existing State personnel he instituted a rotation between foreign 
posts and Washington D.C. which ensured a flow of talent both at home and abroad. He 
also implemented a promotion system that was based on meritorious service and estab-
lished a pension for state personnel. This also meant that the old way of assigning 
cherry posts, which went to men of means and political influence, was abolished.xxxiv  
Because of these reforms the lasting legacy of Francis Huntington-Wilson was a profes-
sional diplomatic corps, which continued long after his departure.  This change was a 
critical necessity for if Taft’s vision of Dollar Diplomacy had any hope for success the 
enterprise needed educated, professional diplomats to carry it out.  These foreign ser-
vice personnel, more than the larger than life personalities at the top of the ladder, car-
ried out the heavy lifting to make America the creditor of capitalistic stability and ex-
porter of democracy to the under developed world.  
This was crucial because one thing American geo-political ambitions could not 
count on in China, unlike Latin America, was military intervention.  Taft struggled with 
the same dilemma in that regard as did Roosevelt.  The Open Door was only valid as 
long as other imperial powers sought to follow it.  And China would only remain inde-
pendent if other imperial powers wished for it to be so.  Of course, all other imperial 
powers with spheres of influence publicly expressed support for both the Open Door 
and China retaining its own sovereignty, the reality was something else entirely.    
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Whether it was political impotence or naivety, perhaps the greatest failing of the 
Taft administration in China was his assumption of sincerity from the other imperial pow-
ers. However, this assumption was not too far fetched a notion to hope for. Many times 
other European powers showed a willingness to assist China in succeeding at retaining 
its sovereignty and becoming more modern. America was instrumental in swaying them 
to do just that. It was William Rockhill, who convinced the other European power to 
scale back on the indemnity demands from China after the Boxer Rebellion. He also en-
couraged them to split it proportionally by who’d suffered the most damage rather than 
equally among them. Further, Europeans also started many successful multi-national 
commercial ventures.  One example was the shared collection of import duties which 
were handled by the Maritime Customs Service.  The Maritime Customs Service was 
headed up by an Englishman named Robert Hart. Upon his appointment to the Cus-
toms Service, Hart doubled the amount of revenue the Qing government received, 
thanks in part to the elimination of corrupt Qing officials who’d been siphoning money 
form it.  But by the time Taft was in office the situation in China, or more specifically with 
the Qing government, was deteriorating rapidly. The balance of power among the impe-
rial powers was shifting faster than it had at any other point.  Since the end of the Tai-
ping Rebellion, the Qing government had never fully regained legitimacy and stabilized 
itself, and with foreign powers “slicing the melon” of China by the time of the Boxer Re-
bellion, anti-foreign sentiment had reached a fever pitch.  Territorial Integrity was a deep 
concern of the Qing government and nowhere was this more acutely felt but in Manchu-
ria.  Since the end of the Russo-Japanese War both the Russians and the Japanese 
had become more and more bold in their demand for concessions specifically with the 
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rail lines; the economic veins of Manchuria. The Qing were desperate to re-establish 
their sovereignty in the region. They reached out to the United States to act as an arbi-
trator.  
The US’s motives in Manchuria were not wholly altruistic. If anything, helping 
China to regain its territorial sovereignty was an added benefit.  There were US busi-
ness interests to consider, and without a significant military presence abroad from the 
United States or the Chinese both players did not hold many cards.  This was a test of 
Dollar Diplomacy and the Open Door, but instead of top diplomats the US had Knox and 
Huntington-Wilson.  These men, in addition to being unlikable, practiced a style of diplo-
macy called Shirt Sleeve diplomacy. Named after the the sleeves of businessman who 
took his coat off in serious negotiations it was characterized by a plain, but direct way of 
speaking, hard negotiating, and a belief that the other side appreciated those aforemen-
tioned qualities.  It was quintessentially American and considered to be departure from 
what was considered the doublespeak of traditional diplomacy.  It was also not very will 
received by the Europeans in China. 
  So in Shirt Sleeve Diplomatic style, Taft at first used diplomatic pressure to try 
and gain a US concession in the Hukuang Loan (1911), along with a mining concern.  
The Hukuang Loan was meant  to finance a railroad through Yangtze Valley, and in or-
der for the US to come in on the loan they had to buy out one of the other members.  
Taft’s first attempt was to buy out the Japanese on the Hukuang Loan but after the foot-
hold Japan had gained in Manchuria, they refused to sell their shares.  After that, none 
of the other powers would budge. So after two years of stonewalling, Taft appealed di-
rectly to the Qing Prince Regent.  It was only then that the US was allowed to join the 
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Hukuang Loan consortium.  Unfortunately, this aggressive style of diplomacy alienated 
both Japan and Russia and united the once hostile powers at the US.  The US was no 
longer a disinterested party who wished to act as an arbiter for China. Now they took an 
active hand in what was perceived as creating their own sphere of interest. It was not 
long after the US muscled its way onto the Hukuang loan that Russians and Japanese 
did what they could to curtail US influence in Manchuria.  When Secretary Knox pro-
posed a railroad neutralization plan as well as currency reform, which was desperately 
needed, the US found no allies among its partners in the Hukuang Loan.  The final 
straw was Secretary of State Knox’s insistence that any currency reform loan be 
headed up by an American.  Thus, the Open Door was declared deceased by Roosevelt 
who became more and more critical of the Taft administration.  It was an overreach by 
Knox since the size of the loans needed for Manchurian development were not possible 
solely for US banking interests.  Because of Knox’s miscalculation, Europeans interests 
were of no mind to give favorable terms to US interests. Instead of ensuring free trade 
and belaying suspicion the Open Door was seen by other imperial powers as a hollow 
sentiment, or worse a financial weapon.  And before Taft could revise his approach, he 
was defeated by Woodrow Wilson in his 1912 re-election Presidential bid after Roose-
velt split the Republican vote.  Within days of taking office Wilson altered course in 
China and nullified all concessions from China, which was a moot point considering the 
instability in China. Thus, ended Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy. 
Ultimately the Open Door, and Dollar Diplomacy were considered failures since 
they failed to achieve their stated objectives. They did not uphold the territorial or ad-
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ministrative integrity of the Qing. There was some limited success in creating commer-
cial opportunities for American businessmen but with the disregard of the Open Door 
under Roosevelt followed by its successor Dollar Diplomacy under Taft from the other 
imperial powers it was a net loss for the United States. That was the biggest contrast 
between the United States and China. For the United States its missteps were not that 
severe. It was a learning opportunity in terms of foreign policy. For Qing it was the end 
of their existence, the collapse of their system. What followed for China was more than 
a century of periods of instability and conflict. For the United States it only continued to 
grow as an imperial power even with a period of isolationism following Woodrow Wil-
son’s presidency. Changes were made in the allocation resources to its military, how it 
sold imperialism to the American public, and how it conducted foreign policy through a 
reorganized State department which was a legacy of the Taft administration.  Money al-
located by the government and the encouragement of commercial development became 
part and parcel for the imperial United States. Those lessons were learned during its 
first steps in empire building in China as it squared off against formidable rivals. 
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